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NOTES
CONFICTS OF LAWS - MULTI - STATE LIBEL - CHOICE OF LAWS UNDER
SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE - The common law rule applicable to actions in-
volving the publication of a libel is that each distribution and sale of a
defamatory statement is a separate and distinct republication and constitutes
a ground upon which a cause of action might be maintained.' Under this
traditional concept a defamed party is allowed as many actions as there are
publications," and, in addition, may sue in every jurisdiction in which the de-
famatory matter is circulated. 3 This is known as the multiple publication
rule, and giving it a strict interpretation a libelee could maintain an action for
each publication, however made.
4
The multiplicity of suits possible under such an interpretation is one of the
major objections to the rule.' This becomes clear when the ability of a vin-
dictive plaintiff to harass the defendant with repeated suits is considered." An
additional objection is the difficulty of establishing with certainty a date of
publication from which the statute of limitations will run.7 These objections
are valid in England where the rule originated, as well as in the United States
where the rule was universally adopted by reference to the common law. A
further objection to the application of this rule occurs in the United States
where a plaintiff also has available a multiplicity of jurisdictions in which to
bring suit, each with separate views as to the substantive rights of the parties.
Modem mass publication and distribution facilities accentuate the difficulties
enumerated in the multiple publication rule and have made this concept ob-
solete.8 This was succinctly stated by Judge Somerville in Age-Herald Pub-
lishing Company v. Huddleston:u "These old common-law principles undoubt-
edly had their origin in a relation to the single acts of individuals, in a primi-
tive society, and cannot, either as a matter of principle or common sense, be
applied without qualification to the publication of modem newspapers." This
reasoning is equally applicable to periodicals, books, radio and television broad-
casts.'" However, in spite of the difficulties involved, the multiple publication
rule is still observed in many states."
1. Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wash. 1943), appeal dis-
missed, 144 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1944); Ott v. Murphy, 160 Iowa 730, 141 N.W. 463
(1913); Woods v. Bangborn, 75 N.Y. 495 (1878); Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 18
Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849); Newell, The Law of Slander and Libel §192 (4th
ed. 1924), Restatement, Torts §578, comment b (1938).
2. Restatement, Torts, §577 (1938) defines publication as follows: "Publication of
defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act to one other
than the person defamed." See also Restatement, Torts §578, comment b (1938).
3. See Prosser, Interstate Publications, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959 (1953).
4. See Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 263, 268 (1952).
5. See notes, 10 La. L. Rev. 339,340 (1950), 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1041, 1042 (1949),
16 U. of Chi. Rev. 164, 167 (1948), 48 Col. L. Rev. 932, 935 (1948).
6. See note, 35 Va. L. Rev. 627 (1949).
7. Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill.App. 59, 66, 78 N.E.2d 708, 711 (1948) (dictum).
See note, 48 Col. L. Rev. 932, 935 (1948).
8. See note, 35 Va. L. Rev. 627, 629 (1949).
9. 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921).
10. See Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform, 33 Minn. L. Rev.
609, 627 (1949).
11. See, e.g., Hartman v. American News Co., 69 F.Supp. 736 (W: D. Wis. 1947);
Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 160 S.W. 246 (1942).
NOTES
THE SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE AND ITS INTERPRETATIONS
To meet these objections the single publication rule has been adopted by
statute -1 2 or developed by judicial decision"s in several states. Under this rule
a libelous statement printed in any publication is considered one inclusive tort
with each separate republication constituting an aggravation of the original
wrong. '4
It is clear that under the common law theory the defamed has a cause of
action in as many jurisdictions as the libelous statement was published. 15 Thus
the determination of a suit in one jurisdiction did not bar a subsequent suit in a
different jurisdiction."
Unfortunately, the same result occurs through an interpretation given the
single publication rule in some states. In O'Reilly v. Curtis Pub. Co.17 the
court held that the single publication rule applied to the internal law of the
state and operated only to group into one action all the defamatory matter cir-
culated within the state. This interpretation has the desirable consequence of
barring succesive suits within a single jurisdiction, but still allows a separate
action in every state in which the libel was published."0 This construction of
the rule does little to overcome the objections to the common law view.
Judge Learned Hand, indicating a different impression of the effects of the
single publication rule on a widely circulated libel, stated, by way of dictum,
in Mattox v. News Syndicate Co.: I" "We assume that in any event a plaintiff
must recover in one action all his damages for all the publications, wherever
made; . . ." This view would group the publication of a libelous statement
over a number of jurisdictions into one composite tort to be adjudicated in one
action in a single jurisdiction.20 This interpretation would eliminate most of
the difficulties inherent in the multiple publication rule. For the same reason it
is preferable to the narrow construction of the single publication rule adopted
by the court in the O'Reilly case.
CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEM
Certainly if the laws of a single jurisdiction are to be applied to adjudicate
a multi-state libel action each case requires the determination of which juris-
diction's laws are to be applied. For example if a libellant domiciled in state A
publishes a libel in state B and C, the court, applying the single publication
12. E.g., Ariz. Code Ann. §§27-2001-27-2005 (Supp. 1954); Cal. Ann. Civ. Code
§§3425.1-3425.5 (West's 1955); N.D. Rev. Code §14-0210 (Supp. 1953).
13. See, Hartman v. Time, Inc., 64 F.Supp. 671 (E. D. Pa. 1946), vacated in part,
166 F.2d 127 (3rd Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 838 (1948); Means v. Mac Fad-
den Publication, Inc., 25 F.Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y 1939); Age-Herald Publishing Co. v.
Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Il1. App. 59, 78
N.E.2d 708 (1948); Bigelow v. Sprauge, 140 Mass. 425, 5 N.E. 144 (1886); Forman v.
Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 190, 14 So.2d 344 (1943); Julian v. Kansas City
Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1907).
14. Hartman v. Time, Inc., 64 F.Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1946), vacated in part, 166 F.2d
127 (3rd Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 838 (1948); Age-Herald Publishing Co. v.
Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254
App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (4th Dept. 1938), aff'd 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d 676
(1939).
15. See note 3, supra.
16. See note, 23 So. Calif. L. Rev. 51, 52 (1949).
17. 31 F.Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940).
18. See notes, 10 La. L. Rev. 339, 341 (1950), 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 335, 336 (1954).
19. 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949).
20. See 24 So. Calif. L. Rev. 103, 104 (1950).
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rule as interpreted by Judge Hand in the Mattox case, would be forced to make
a choice of law.
In Hartman v. Time, Inc.,21 the court, when faced with a libel published in
a nationally circulated magazine, by implication gave the single publication rule
its most desirable interpretation to date by viewing the defamation published
in all single publication states as giving rise to only one cause of action. 22 This
costruction appeared to necessitate a determination of what state law should
control the disposition of the action. The court, however, felt differently and
indicated instead that in a multi-state libel the law of each state in which the
libel was published would be referred to and applied by the forum.23 It is
submitted that a more desirable solution could have been effectuated by apply-
ing the law of a single jurisdiction rather than that of many states.
CONTACT POINTS FOR CHOICE OF LAW SELECTION
If a plaintiff is limited to a single action in a multi-state libel a conflict of
laws problem is squarely posed. For example, in a libel action the place of
wrong is where the defamatory matter is communicated to a third person.2- 1
When a libel has simultaneously occured in a number of jurisdictions, the law
of each is applicable to the tort. In an effort to aid the courts in selecting the
law to be applied, a number of possible contact points have been advanced by
judges and legal writers.
2
a. The plaintiff's domicil has been suggested as a governing factor in mak-
ing the choice of law on the theory that this would be the location of the
plaintiff's principal reputation and therefore the jurisdiction in which he
would suffer the greatest harm.26 However, if the plaintiff's reputation
exists in a state other than that of his domicil, the rationale for this rule
disappears.27
b. To overcome the objections to the application of the law of the plaintiff's
domicil, it has been submitted that the law of the state of the plaintiff's
principal activity to which the defamation relates should govern.2 8 This
theory would be difficult to employ, however, since a libelee might carry
on his business equally in more than one state. Furthermore, no comp-
rehensive definition has been made of the term "activity". Hence, courts
are free to place different connotations on the term.
29
c. The common law impact theory of torts is reflected in the recommenda-
tion that the law of the state where plaintiff suffered the greatest harm
21. 64 F.Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1946), vacated in part, 166 F.2d 127 (3rd Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 334 U. S. 838 (1948).
22. Ibid. See 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1460 (1948). See also notes, 23 So. Calif. L. Rev. 51,
n. 30 (1949); 48 Col. L. Rev. 932 (1948). The Circuit Court held that, in states fol-
lowing the inult ple publication rule, each publication constituted a separate cause of action.
23. Note, 23 So. Calif. L. Rev. 51 (1949).
24. Restatement, Conflicts of Laws §377 (5) (1938).
25. See Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 447, 454
(1953). See also notes, 35 Va. L. Rev. 627, 632 (1949), 43 11. L. Rev. 556, 560 (1948),
60 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 943 (1947).
26. Notes, 35 Va. L. Rev. 627, 636 (1949), 60 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 947 (1947).
27. Ibid.
28. Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 447, 455 (1953).
29. In determining the site of the plaintiff's principal activity the court must first de-
termine what factor will be used in definition of the term. For example, in the case of a
railroad, the term activity could be interpreted as miles of trackage, passengers carried,
freight or revenue received from a single jurisdiction.
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be chosen. :1° An objection to this contact point is the difficulty of deter-
mining, particularly in the case of a widely known plaintiff, where the
greatest injury occured.31
d. The state of the defendant's domicil or incorporation has been advanced
as the most convenient contact point to utilize.32 The adoption of this
situs, however, would place the plaintiff at a disadvantage by allowing a
publisher to choose a state with lenient libel laws for his dorpicil re-
gardless of the location of the main offices or publishing plants.
3 a
c. Another contact point advocated is that of the state of the principal cir-
culation of the defamatory matter. 34 The impossibility of determining
such a location presents a disqualifying objection to this choice. 35
f. A further contact point suggested to aid the court in its choice of an
applicable law is the jurisdiction in which the libel is first seen.36 The
almost simultaneous publication of a libel on a radio and television broad-
cast seriously limits the usefulness of this choice.
g. The law of the forum has been advanced as a possible choice of an ap-
plicable lawA3 This is based on the familiarity which the court should
have with its own laws. 3s However, by choosing to apply its own law,
the court would, in effect, allow the plaintiff to select from among the
states in which he sustained inury, the one in which he might receive the
most favorable verdict.
3 9
The interpretation of the single publication rule and the ascertainment of
substantive law applicable to a multi-state libel were before the court in the
recent case of Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co.40 This action involved an
alleged libel printed by the defendant company, publisher of the New York
Daily News. A libel suit was commenced in New York by a resident of New
Jersey. Plaintiff died before the trial and his administratrix was substituted as
party plaintiff. The defendant, a New York domicilliary, moved to dismiss the
action on the ground that it was governed by New Jersey law and under that
law a cause of action abates on the death of the injured party. 41 Under the law
of New York the cause of action survives.4 2 The court, in denying the defend-
ant's motion, held that the decision involved a problem too important to be
decided on procedural grounds.
4 3
The court was asked on the basis of the pleadings to select the law of the
plaintiff's domicil to govern the action before it. It is true that a federal court,
30. See Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949).
31. See note, 25 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 165 (1950). See also notes, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1272
(1950), 34 Minn. L. Rev. 332 (1950).
32. Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 447, 454 (1953).
33. Ibid.
34. Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in Forty Eight iPeces Vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32
Minn. L. Rev. 734, 761 (1948).
35. Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 447, 455 (1953).
36. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., 30 F.Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
37. Ludwig supra note 34, at 760.
38. Ibid.
39. Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 447, 456 (1953).
40. 130 F.Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
41. Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co., supra note 41, at 18, citing Decedent Estate Law,
McK. Consol, Laws, c., 13, §119.
42. Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co., supra note. 41, at 18, citing N. J. Stat. Ann. Title
2A: 15-3.
43. In denying the motion to dismiss, the court cites, 2 Moore, Federal Practice 2245
(2d ed. 1948): "(A) complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears
to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of the claim."
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which has assumed jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship is
bound by the conflicts of laws rule in effect in the state in which it sits.44
However, as the decision pointed out, the jurisdictional law applicable to
actions of this nature has not been conclusively determined in New York, and
such a choice of law cannot be made without a consideration of the merits of
the plaintiff's cause of action. The court mentioned that although the plaintiff
was domiciled in New Jersey, the majority of the contact points advocated by
legal writers existed in New York. Hence, the trial court could conceivably
hold, as in Dale System v. General Teleradio,4 5 that the law of the forumn
should govern on these grounds.
CONCLUSION
The different substantive concepts employed by various states concerning the
adjudication of a multi-state libel; the difference in the interpretation of the
single publication rule in separate courts, and the general reluctance of the
judiciary to decide the conflict of laws problem inherent in such an action 4' 3
have prevented the interested parties from obtaining in one action a complete
determination of their rights. To resolve this present unsettled state the pro-
mulgation of a conflict of laws doctrine which will result in uniformity, con-
venience and justice should be made.
In 1952 the National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws proposed a Uniform Single Publications Act. This Act, which has been
approved by the American Bar Association and adopted by several states,'-
is designed to include in a plaintiff's recovery damages for the whole wrong
wherever committed.48 It is intended to preclude, under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution, any later action anywhere on the
same wrong.4 9 In addition, the Act provides that the time of the initial publi-
cation will be the date from which the statute of limitations will run.
It is submitted that the attainment of a uniform conflicts of laws doctrine
requires the establishment of a single standard to be followed by all forty-
eight states. While difficulty is anticipated in obtaining unanimous adoption
of such a standard, some definite progress has been made.
DAvm A. VAALER
44. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S, 487 (1941).
45. 105 F.Supp. 745, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
46. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 965, n. 32.
47. See note 12 supra.
48. See Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 263, 276 (1952).
49. Ibid.
